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POINT ONE 
THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF LAW 
SHOULD BE REVIEWED UNDER A 
CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD 
The Board incorrectly states the appropriate standard of review. Petitioner is 
seeking relief under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(b) and (d), which allows 
judicial review of an agency action beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute, 
or an agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law. The appropriate 
standard of review for cases falling under subsection (4)(b) was addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Bennion v. ANR Production Co.. 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991). 
Bennion held that challenges under subsection (4)(b) present questions of general law 
appropriate for correction of error standard, with no deference to agency 
interpretation. Id at 349. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of review for 
cases falling under subsection (4)(d) in Savage Industries v. State Tax Com'n.. 811 
P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). Regarding subsection (4)(d) Savage held: 
This incorporates the correction of error standard previously applied by 
the Utah courts in cases involving agency interpretations of law. This 
incorporation of the correction of error standard is confirmed by looking 
at the legislative history of the UAPA . . .This approach is mandated 
whether arrived at under the terms of the UAPA or under the holdings 
of our prior case law. 
Id at 669-670. 
The Board misapplies Utah case law in support of its argument that the 
reviewing court should grant deference to the Board's interpretation of law. These 
misapplications, found on pages one and two of its brief, result from quotations taken 
out of context. The Board confuses the standard of review issue when it states on 
page one of its brief: 
2 
Because the claimant does not dispute the underlying material facts, the 
Board's decision '"calls for application of statutes and administrative 
rules to a specific factual situation.'" SOS Staffing Servs., Inc. V. 
Workforce Appeals Bd., 1999 UT App 210, ^ 8, 983 P.2d 581 (quoting 
Professional Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec, 953 
P.2d 76,79 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
This is a misrepresentation of SOS. In SOS the issue presented to the court 
concerned the Board's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-405( 1 )(a) providing 
that, "A claimant is ineligible for benefits if 'the claimant left work voluntarily 
without good cause.'" Because the claimants did not dispute having left the employ 
of SOS Staffing Services voluntarily, the court determined the degree of deference 
would be less than if those facts had been in dispute. The court found in SOS that: 
Here, because "proper application of the Employment Security Act and 
the relevant rules 'requires little highly specialized or technical 
knowledge that would be uniquely within the [Board's ] expertise' 
. . . this court will review the agency's decision 'with only moderate 
deference.'"[citations omitted]. 
The Board misinterprets SOS in its relevancy to the present case. The lack of 
dispute of the underlying facts, in the present case, cannot lead to the conclusion that 
the present case is "like" SOS, in that, here, petitioner is concerned only with the 
issue of jurisdiction, and interpretations of law related to that issue. 
Likewise, the Board's reliance upon King v. Industrial Comm'n.. 850 P.2d 
1281 (Utah Ct. App 1993) is misplaced. In King, the court reviewed prior case law 
3 
concerning the question of finding "explicit" or "implied" grants of discretion to the 
agency. In that case the court concluded that under a specific portion of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988), there was no express 
or implied grant of discretion given to the agency. The court held in that case: 
[Bjecause the language is not broad and expansive but is narrow and 
mandatory and is subject to construction by traditional rules of statutory 
construction, the statute does not contain an implicit grant of discretion. 
We, therefore, review the Industrial Commission's action . . . for 
correctness. 
Professional Staff Mgmt.. Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec. 953 P.2d 76, 79 
(Utah Cr. App. 1998) is similarly taken out of context, and is irrelevant in the present 
case. 
The Board next cites Morton Intern.. Inc. V. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 5 81 (Utah 
1991) in support of its argument that a "degree of deference" should be given to the 
Board if its decision is within "the bounds of reasonableness." The Board 
misrepresents Morton by taking statements out of context, and instead presents 
another case which does not support the Board's view. Morton addressed the issue 
whether standards of review developed in prior case law had been altered after the 
adoption of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act. The Court found that Utah 
courts had developed "three levels of review in connection with agency action": 
First, agencies' findings of fact were granted considerable deference and 
4 
would not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence 
(footnote omitted). Second, a correction-of-error standard, giving no 
deference to agencies decisions, was used to review agencies' rulings on 
issues the court characterized as concerning general law (footnote 
omitted). Examples of issues characterized as questions of general law 
include . . . rulings concerning the agency's jurisdiction or statutory 
authority... and rulings concerning interpretation of statutes unrelated 
to the agency (footnote omitted). 
Id at 585. The court also held in Morton: 
[I]n granting judicial relief when an 'agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law,' the language of section 63-46b-16(4) clearly 
indicates that absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard 
is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a 
statutory term (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 588. Citing Morton, the court comments in Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce. 
828 P.2d 507, 514 n.12 (Utah App. 1992): 
We note for purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review 
that a grant of discretion to an agency to make factual findings . . . 
should not be confused with a grant of discretion to interpret a given 
statutory term. Since the authority to make factual findings is often 
granted to agencies, such a misinterpretation would require deference to 
agencies in virtually every case-thereby causing the exception to 
consume the rule set forth in Morton. In the present case, the petitioner 
seeks relief from the court only in regards to the Department's 
interpretation of law as it relates to its assumption of jurisdiction for the 
purpose of imposing civil penalties. Because the present case is 
restricted to this single issue, Utah case law supports that a correction 
of error standard of review is appropriate. 
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POINT TWO 
THE RULE OF "PLAIN LANGUAGE" DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
The Board argues that the "plain meaning" of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 
supports an interpretation of law which grants to itself continuous jurisdiction for the 
purpose of imposing the civil penalty described in Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-
405(5)(c). The Board's argument is a specious application of the fundamental rule of 
statutory construction as articulated in Zoll & Branch. P.C. v. Assay. 932 P.2d 592, 
594 (Utah 1997): 
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are 
generally to be construed according to their plain language. 
Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to 
contradict its plain meaning. Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 
P.2d 1020 (1995) (and cases cited therein). 
The above rule, that language may not be interpreted contrary to its "plain 
meaning," is related to another established rule of statutory construction, that "a word 
is known by the company it keeps." This latter principle has been restated through 
other maxims, one of which is "expressio unious est exclusio" ("expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of the other").1 Under this doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court 
•Hansen v. Wilkinson. 658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983). 
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cites remarks in Sutherland Statutory Construction that "it probably is not wholly 
inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean 
something else."2 Applying this principle, it must be noted that the actual words 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 do not include the language, or refer to the 
language providing the specific "civil penalty" described in Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-
405(5)(c). Under the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the "meaning" 
of "civil penalty," as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c)3 cannot be 
included as an integral part Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406, because the word "civil 
penalty" is not said. To do so would impute to the legislature that when they say (and 
define) one thing, i.e. "benefits,"4 or "repayment of benefits," they really mean 
something else entirely. 
The Board cites, on page ten of its brief, Decker v. Industrial Commission. 533 
P.2d 898,899 (Utah 1975). This case is irrelevant here. The petitioner has not asked 
the Board to "reduce or forgive any part of the penalty." The petitioner argues only 
2IcL, citing 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01 (4th ed. 
1973). 
3
"an amount equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of 
his fraud" 
4
 Defined under § 35A-4-201(3) "Benefits" means the money payments 
payable to an individual as provided in this chapter with respect to the individual's 
unemployment. 
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that the Board lacks jurisdiction to impose the civil penalty provided under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35 A-4-405(5)(c), and that the Board misinterprets the Utah Employment 
Security Act when it attempts to bring the civil penalty imposed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c) under the provisions for continuing jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2)(a) and (4)(a). 
POINT THREE 
ADDING OR DELETING WORDS 
TO THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY UTAH CASE LAW OR 
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The Board argues on page ten of its brief that "The plain language of a statute 
is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other 
provisions in the same statute and 'with other statutes under the same and related 
chapters'" (citations omitted). The Board confuses this "plain language" argument 
by next requesting, on page eleven of its brief, that the court engage in a type of 
statutory interpretation that requires remedies provided only under traditional rules 
of statutory construction, i.e., the insertion or incorporation of words or concepts not 
explicitly stated in the statute. Utah courts apply these rules of statutory construction 
only when statutes are found ambiguous: "When language is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." 
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Luckau v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission Of Utah. 840 P.2d 811,815 
(Utah App. 1992). The rule is stated in Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce. 828 P.2d 
507, 510 (Utah App. 1992): 
If a statute is ambiguous, however, we apply traditional rules of 
statutory construction under the assumption that the Legislature was 
operating under such rules. We also assume that the Legislature 
expected the agency to likewise apply the traditional rules of statutory 
interpretation. No deference is therefore given to the agency's 
interpretation if an otherwise ambiguous statute may be interpreted in 
accordance with traditional rules of interpretation. See Morton at 589. 
Rather than a "plain language" argument, the Board's argument suggests an 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 which would, in effect, insert the 
words "civil penalty" under subsection 2(a) alongside the word "benefits," and under 
subsection 4(a) alongside the provision requiring repayment of benefits. (Adding the 
words under only (2)(a) or only (4)(a) would leave the section ambiguous). Adding 
the words "civil penalty" into Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2) and (4)(a) would, 
indeed, correct any assumed oversight or inadvertent omission by the legislature, 
however, Utah courts have denied the power to do so. In Luckau v. Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission Of Utah. 840 P.2d 811,815 (Utah App. 1992) the court 
held: 
In interpreting a statute, courts should avoid adding to or 
deleting from statutory language, unless absolutely 
necessary to "make it a rational statute." 2A Norman J. 
9 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.38 (5th ed. 
1992); see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 
65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991). 
. . . .We presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and gave effect to each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning. We must be guided by the 
law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is 
left for construction. Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 
872, 875 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
POINT FOUR 
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISH 
INDEPENDENT SECTIONS FROM DEPENDENT SUBSECTIONS 
The Board next argues that the terms 'benefits' or 'repay the sum' under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2)(a) and (4)(a) should be interpreted as effectively 
incorporating the meaning of "civil penalty" as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-
4-405, because "it is clear from the way the relevant, correlated statutes are worded, 
that benefit overpayments and their accompanying civil penalties are interrelated and 
are to be addressed together." (See page eleven of brief). The Board provides no 
examples of "relevant, correlated statutes," citing only a different section of the 
Employment Security Act. The section cited, Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-305, provides 
for the collection of monies owed to the unemployment insurance fund through civil 
collection actions, after the employer or claimant defaults on monies owed. The court 
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in Zoll addressed the appropriate rule of statutory construction to be applied when 
determining the relationship between sections and subsections within a statute: 
. . . The distinction between a subsection and an independent section of 
a statute is that the subsection, by its nature, is placed within a context 
and thereby limited to the degree that the independent section is not. 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.01 (5th ed. 
1992) (footnote omitted). 
Zoll & Branch. P.C. v. Assay. 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). In United States v. 
Butchelder. 581 F2d626(CA7 1978) the court held, "Ifthe meaning of any particular 
phrase or section standing alone is clear, no other section or part of the act may be 
applied to create doubt." In the present case, Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-305 should 
not be interpreted as providing a template for statutory construction of every other 
section of the Employment Security Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 35A-4-406,35A-4-405 
and 35A-4-305 are separate sections within the statute, are clear standing alone, and 
create no disharmony amongst their own or other provisions in the same statute. On 
the other hand, Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2) and (4) should be interpreted 
through, and limited by, the context of the section they occur within. Thus, 
"continuing jurisdiction" in subsection (2) is granted over "benefits" and the 
"repayment of benefits" as provided in subsection (4). 
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POINT FIVE 
"BENEFITS" ARE DEFINED BY THE 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
The term 'benefits,' as used within the sentence "Jurisdiction over benefits 
shall be continuous," under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2)(a) and (4)(a) is defined 
under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-201(3): 
"Benefits" means the money payments payable to an individual as 
provided in this chapter with respect to the individual's unemployment. 
Sutherland Statutory Construction5 states: 
As a rule a definition which declares what a term means is binding upon 
the courts. Limitations have been noted. For example, if the definition 
is arbitrary, creates obvious incongruities in the statute, defeats a major 
purpose of the legislation or is so discordant to common usage as to 
generate confusion, it should not be used . . . A definition which 
declares what a term means, on the other hand, excludes any meaning 
that is not stated. 
In the present case, the meaning of the term 'benefits' has been declared by the 
Employment Security Act. The definition is not arbitrary nor discordant to common 
usage, does not create incongruities in the statute, and does not defeat a major 
purpose of the legislation.6 "Benefits," or their "repayment," should, therefore, not 
52A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.07 (6th ed. 
2000). 
6Leaving "benefits" defined as provided in the statute necessarily entails 
disgorgement of any benefits procured by the claimant's wrongdoing, thereby 
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be redefined to conceptually incorporate the meaning of the term 'civil penalties' as 
the term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c). Incorporating the civil 
penalty provided under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c) into the meaning of 
"benefits" or their repayment, would, itself, create an arbitrary and incongruous 
result. The term 'benefits,' and their repayment, as it presently occurs withing Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 is logical within the context of that section: 
35A-4-406(2)(a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous 
35A-4-406(4)(a) Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received 
any sum as benefits (i.e., "money payments payable to an individual 
with respect to the individual's unemployment") under this chapter 
to which he was not entitled shall repay the sum to the division for the 
fund. 
The insertion of the term 'civil penalties,' as that term is used under Utah Code Ann. 
§35A-4-405(5)(c) would rewrite the section to read: 
35A-4-406(4)(a) Any person who by reason of his fraud, has received 
any sum as benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall 
repay the sum ("money payments payable to an individual with 
respect to the individual's unemployment and, an amount equal to 
the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud") to 
the division for the fund. 
The present wording under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(4)(a), requiring any person 
to "repay the sum" he has "received" (as benefits) is, thereby, redefined to require 
encouraging honesty in reporting and a replenishment of the fund. 
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"repayment" of an amount of money which was at no time "received" by the person 
(the civil penalty doubles the sum actually received). Because the term 'repay' 
cannot be credibly redefined to include an amount never paid, "repay" would need 
to be deleted in subsection (4)(a). After ridding subsection (4)(a) of the word "repay," 
it must next be assumed that "benefits" under subsection (2)(a) can be sufficiently 
broadened in its definition under Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-201 (3), to include the civil 
penalty provision under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c), thereby, allowing the 
"continuing jurisdiction" sought by the Board. The necessary redefining of 
subsections (4)(a) and (2)(a) to accomplish the Board's goals, generates incongruities 
and, therefore, confusion in the provisions under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406. 
POINT SIX 
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
DO NOT SUPPORT AN "ASSOCIATION OF WORDS" 
The Board's argues on page eleven of its brief, that provisions under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-4-305 make it clear that "benefit overpayments" and "civil 
penalties" are "linked," "interrelated," and "are to be addressed together." Whether 
or not "civil penalties" and "benefit overpayments" are "linked," or in what way the 
terms are "interrelated" and should be "addressed together," requires an analysis 
through, and an application of, the rule of statutory construction for the "associations 
14 
of words." Involved specifically, are certain other doctrines included within the 
statutory construction principle that "a word is known by the company it keeps." This 
rule of statutory construction is elaborated upon in Hansen v. Wilkinson. 658 p.2d 
1216,1217 (Utah 1983): 
The concisely expressed principle that "a word is known by the 
company it keeps" has been restated throughout the jurisdictions of this 
country [footnote omitted] under the maxims of (1) "noscitur a sociis"7 
(2) "ejusdem generis",8... The first of these doctrines postulates that 
"the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the 
meaning of words associated with it," the second that "general and 
specific words which are capable of an analogous meaning, being 
associated together, take color from each other so that the general words 
are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general." [Citations 
omitted.] In 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, §47.16, 
et seq., (4th ed. 1973) the first of these doctrines is explained as follows: 
"When two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a 
similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word 
will be limited and qualified by the special word." The second of the 
above doctrines is commonly applied, so that "where general words are 
subjoined to specific words, the general words will not include any 
objects of a class superior to that designated by the specific words.".. 
[Citations omitted.] 
One implication, in an analysis of the Board's argument, is that the meaning 
of 'benefit overpayments,' as the broader term, should be interpreted in a way which 
includes 'civil penalty,' as the specific term. Drawing such an association between 
7
 "It is known from its associates." 
8
 "Of the same class." 
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the words "benefit overpayments" and "civil penalty" under the maxim ofnoscitur 
a sociis, requires that "benefit overpayments" be grouped within a category of things 
with similar meanings which also includes the words "civil penalty," and that the 
former term is limited and qualified by, the later term. If the words "benefit 
overpayments" and "civil penalties" are thus considered, established rules of statutory 
construction require an examination whether the definition of "civil penalty" is 
understood as applying to things of the same kind as "benefit overpayments," and 
also whether "benefit overpayments" include any object of a class superior to "civil 
penalty." 
While the "repayment of benefits," may be thought of as a type of "penalty" in 
its broad sense, a "civil penalty" is not a type of "benefit overpayment." A "civil 
penalty" is "a sum of money which the law exacts payment of by way of punishment 
for doing some act which is prohibited or for not doing some act which is required to 
be done."9 A "benefit overpayment" is the receiving of payment of money to any 
person to which, under a redetermination or decision, he has been found not entitled.10 
Within the meaning of the Employment Security Act, a "benefit overpayment" may 
occur through agency error, an individual's error, an individual's "fault," or an 
9Black's Law Dictionary 1020 (Fifth ed. 1979). 
10Utah Code Ann. § 34A-4-406(4). 
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individual's "fraud." Therefore, the term 'benefit overpayment,' within the context 
of the Employment Security Act, belongs to a class comprised of different kinds of 
things than a "civil penalty," and the term 'benefits overpayment' cannot, therefore, 
be limited by the term 'civil penalty.' The two terms cannot be "grouped" together, 
because they do not have a similar meaning. Thus, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis 
does not apply 
Under the maxim of ejusdem generis, the words "benefit overpayments" and 
"civil penalty" must, being associated together, take color from each other so that 
"benefit overpayments" is restricted to a sense analogous to "civil penalty," and does 
not include any objects of a class superior to that designated by "civil penalty." As 
argued above, "benefit overpayments" is not capable of an analogous meaning with 
"civil penalty." Additionally, the class of objects belonging to the category of "benefit 
overpayments" are also of a much broader designation, than the term 'civil penalty' 
can encompass. 
Sutherland Statutory Construction states that, "Where a general term appears 
with no enumeration, with other general terms, or with specific terms not suggesting 
a class, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply."77 In the present case, the maxim 
"2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:20 (6th ed. 
2000). 
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cannot, therefore, apply, because the general term 'benefit overpayments' appears 
with no enumeration. The context within which the term 'civil penalty' occurs, 
suggests more of "general term" or a "specific term not suggesting a class."12 
POINT SEVEN 
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THE BOARD'S PRESENT INTERPRETATION 
The Board argues on page twelve of its brief, that granting it continuous 
jurisdiction for the purpose of imposing the civil penalty provided for under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c) is required to protect the fiscal soundness of the 
unemployment insurance fund. The court in Morton states that: 
Questions of legislative intent are considered questions of law, which 
are reviewed for correctness under our prior case law (footnote omitted) 
and section 63-46b-16(4)(d). Therefore, when a legislative intent 
concerning the specific question at issue can be derived through 
traditional methods of statutory construction, the agency's interpretation 
will be granted no deference and the statute will be interpreted in accord 
with its legislative intent. 
12A more logical example of word association under these doctrines would 
be the association of "farm products" and "eggs." A more complete list of "farm 
products"-"eggs," "apples," "wheat" . . . would limit "farm products" to things of 
that nature. A "dog" bred to guard the farm, and exacting more from thieves than 
the "return of the products" (perhaps analogous to a civil penalty which exacts 
more than a "repayment of benefits") would not properly be included within the 
category of "farm products." 
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Morton Intern.. Inc. V. Auditing Div. 814 P.2d 581, 588, 599 (Utah 1991): the court 
cites Savage Industries v. State Tax Com,n..811 P. 2d 664, 666, 670 (Utah 1991); 
Hurlev v. Board of Review. 767 P.2d 524,527 (Utah 1988). 
As argued above, Utah Code Ann.§ 35A-4-406 already serves to protect the 
fund through the necessary disgorgement of any benefits procured by the claimant's 
wrongdoing. (See footnote 6). This continuing legal obligation under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 35A-4-406(4)(a) for any person who has received any sum by reason of his 
fraud, to repay that sum, serves as a "penalty," thereby furthering the legislative 
purpose of encouraging honesty in reporting. 
It should not be forgotten that the legislature has expressed a desire to place a 
limitation of one year upon the state's power to impose civil penalties through Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-29(3). These restrictive legislative provisions further another 
important legislative purpose: the statute of limitations prevents the state from 
pursuing individuals for civil penalties long after the date of the alleged wrongdoing, 
when these allegations have become all but impossible to defend against. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should find that neither "plain language" arguments, nor established 
rules of statutory construction, as applied throughout Utah case law, support the 
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Board's interpretation or application of the Employment Security Act. There is no 
permissible interpretation of Utah Code Ann.§ 35A-4-406(2)(a) or (4)(a) through 
which the Department of Workforce Services is provided with continuing jurisdiction 
for the purpose of imposing a civil penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-405(5)(c). 
Because the Utah Employment Securities Act does not provide a special case where 
a "different limitation is prescribed by statute," as required under the statute of 
limitations, and because the Department failed to bring its action within the 
prescribed one-year period provided for, it lacked jurisdiction to impose the civil 
penalty. 
The Workforce Appeals Board should be reversed on the issue of its 
assumption of jurisdiction for the purposes of imposing the civil penalty. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ { day of August, 2002. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
BY: L. Kathleen Ferro 
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